The attack targeting Abu Zuhur Air Base in Idlib once again brought security tensions between Türkiye and Israel to the forefront in Syria. Dr. Ömer Behram Özdemir, a faculty member at Ibn Haldun University, analyzed the background to the attack and Ankara’s possible position in its Syria policy.
Özdemir said the base was empty at the time of the attack because it had not entered a renovation and reconstruction process. He said this limited the likelihood of casualties and extensive material damage.
Abu Zuhur’s position in the Syrian theater
Located 70 kilometers from the Turkish border, Abu Zuhur Air Base was one of the key centers in the struggle for control between the Assad regime and opposition groups throughout the Syrian civil war. The base’s runways, location and extensive grounds give it the potential to become one of northern Syria’s important air bases.
Özdemir wrote that Turkish Armed Forces personnel were expected to be deployed at the base, which was planned to be reopened with increased capacity in the new period in Syria, under the security agreement between Ankara and Damascus. Israel also targeted the T4 Base in Homs with airstrikes in 2025, where Turkish Armed Forces personnel were expected to be deployed.
Official response to the claim about a Turkish delegation
After the attack, some international media outlets claimed that a Turkish military delegation had been in and around the base area several hours before the incident. The Ministry of National Defense denied the claim and said Israel must end its actions affecting both the region and Syria’s stability.
Özdemir argued that the Israeli government viewed Türkiye’s political and military presence in Syria as a threat. He also said that Türkiye’s influence in Syria had been raised during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visits to the United States over the previous two years.
Syria messages from Washington and Tel Aviv
In his assessment of Netanyahu’s latest visit to the United States, Özdemir said Netanyahu had claimed that Türkiye was operating across a wider area in Syria than Israel. He added that U.S. President Donald Trump had said Türkiye’s presence in Syria, unlike Israel’s, was based on an official invitation.
Özdemir drew attention to the fact that the attack took place after U.S. Ambassador Tom Barrack met with Syrian Foreign Minister Assad Hassan al-Shaibani in Istanbul and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan made statements about visiting Syria. He assessed that these developments could constitute a message to Türkiye and the United States from Israel.
A possible roadmap for Ankara
Özdemir said the attack once again demonstrated the need for a functional conflict-prevention mechanism between Türkiye and Israel. He argued that Türkiye could choose to balance Israel in Syria through the United States as much as possible and that this approach would be more effective for Syria’s stability and reconstruction process.
He argued that cooperation between the reconstituted Syrian army and the Turkish Armed Forces, including military training, intelligence sharing and joint exercises, could increase Ankara’s influence in Syria. He said actions such as the attack on Abu Zuhur could disrupt the process in the short term but could produce negative consequences for Israel’s objectives in the region over the medium and long term.
Özdemir also assessed that Israel could increasingly view Türkiye’s political and military presence in the region as a threat. He argued that Türkiye-centered narratives could become more prominent in Israel’s domestic and foreign policy, while efforts to counterbalance Türkiye through Greece over Cyprus and the Aegean islands could also become more visible.
In his conclusion, Özdemir argued that Türkiye should continue its policy of avoiding conflict and strengthening its allies in the region. He said that, for Syria’s future and regional stability, energy should be directed toward institution-building and development rather than conflict.
