Palestine Chronicle editor and journalist Ramzy Baroud argued that October 7, 2023, marked a turning point in Israel’s security doctrine at a time when fronts linked to Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Iran, alongside Gaza, were heightening regional tensions. Baroud examined the evolution of Israel’s security paradigm from 1897 to the present.
The foundations of Israel’s security outlook
According to Baroud, the Zionist movement turned toward Palestine after the First Zionist Congress, held in Basel in 1897. He wrote that Israel’s security outlook was built on the assumption that Arab armies’ military resistance would be ineffective against overwhelming force.
Baroud wrote that David Ben-Gurion and his close circle prepared files between 1940 and 1947 containing plans, topographical information, infrastructure details and socioeconomic data on Palestinian villages. He identified the military forces trained during the British Mandate and the 1948 Plan Dalet as among the factors that reinforced Israel’s military superiority.
Baroud argued that David Ben-Gurion adopted Ze’ev Jabotinsky’s “Iron Wall” doctrine after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. He said the doctrine was based on rapid mobilization, preemptive strikes and taking the conflict into the other side’s territory.
The perception reinforced by the 1967 War
Baroud argued that the 1967 War was decisive in Israel’s emergence as a regional power that viewed itself as invincible. He wrote that Israel took control within six days of a wide area including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights, while also occupying the Sinai Peninsula.
In Baroud’s view, these developments strengthened the belief that Israel had achieved the “strategic depth” it sought. He wrote that after the war, the Arab world’s objective narrowed from liberating all of Palestine to reclaiming the territories lost in 1967.
Baroud also argued that the 1967 War reshaped the strategic relationship between the United States and Israel. He said Israel strengthened its position as a regional partner for Washington, while the influence of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and pro-Israel organizations on U.S. politics grew in subsequent years.
The crack that emerged in 1973
Baroud described the October 1973 War as the event that created the first major crack in Israel’s perception of military invincibility. He wrote that the simultaneous attack by Egypt and Syria caught Israel unprepared, with Egyptian forces crossing the Suez Canal and Syrian units entering the Golan Heights.
Baroud wrote that Israel changed the course of the war by declaring mobilization and receiving military supplies from the United States. Although Israel avoided an outright defeat, he argued, the war showed that Arab armies acting with preparation and coordination could produce serious military and psychological consequences.
According to Baroud, Israel sought to remove Egypt from the regional military equation after the 1973 War. As a result of the Camp David process and the 1979 Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty, the Sinai Peninsula was returned to Egypt, which became the first Arab state to recognize Israel.
The pursuit of political dominance from 1973 to 2023
Baroud argued that from 1973 to 2023, Israel used military power, diplomacy, economic pressure and political initiatives together to neutralize its rivals in the Arab world. He wrote that the Arab world fragmented during this period, some former rivals became allies, and the Palestinian issue lost weight in regional politics.
Baroud described the 1993 Oslo Accords as one of the symbols of this transformation. He argued that the accords did not end the occupation and created a new structure based on governing Palestinians within a system controlled by Israel.
The writer said divisions among Palestinians deepened after Hamas won the 2006 legislative elections. He wrote that the blockade imposed by Israel and, he said, reinforced by Egypt took shape during this period. Baroud described Gaza as an arena in which Israel demonstrated its military superiority through the conflicts of 2008-2009, 2012, 2014 and 2021.
After October 7, 2023
Baroud argued that the events of October 7, 2023, shook the assumption that Israel’s security and intelligence systems were impenetrable. He said the events exposed the limits of the “Iron Wall” doctrine on which Israel had relied for nearly a century.
Baroud wrote that after October 7, fronts linked to Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq and Iran, alongside Gaza, heightened regional tensions. He said this situation challenged Israel’s strategy of confronting its rivals separately.
In Baroud’s view, October 7 returned the Palestinian issue to the center of global politics and increased international solidarity around Gaza. He also argued that a shared sense of national identity grew stronger among Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem, the 1948 lands and the diaspora.
Baroud wrote that after October 7, Israel sought to restore its deterrence through military force and settle its previous strategic calculations. He concluded that although Israel’s military capabilities remain intact, rebuilding the assumption of psychological superiority underpinning the “Iron Wall” doctrine would be difficult.
