The Mecca Joint Defense Agreement, described as having been signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye in Mecca on August 7, 2026, has moved to the center of regional security debates with its provision that an attack on one member would be considered an attack on all members. Because of this provision, the agreement has been compared with Article 5 of NATO, while some assessments have referred to the structure as an "Islamic NATO."
The agreement emerged after the bilateral defense agreement signed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in 2025 evolved into a trilateral structure with Türkiye's participation within a year, demonstrating that the partnership quickly acquired a multilateral character. This has prompted debate over whether the Mecca-centered security structure will remain limited to the three existing countries and which new members could join.
Egypt's regional weight
Egypt is one of the countries most prominent in possible expansion scenarios. Incorporating Cairo's military and political weight in the Arab world and the Middle East could increase the alliance's regional representational power.
Egypt's participation could also affect the security balance in the eastern Mediterranean. Although Cairo's existing maritime jurisdiction agreements with Athens and Nicosia would shape the limits of this impact, Egypt's inclusion in the same defense mechanism as Türkiye could create a new balance against the networks of cooperation among Israel, Greece, the Greek Cypriot Administration and the United Arab Emirates.
This membership could also reinforce the message that the Mecca agreement is not an alternative to the security relations maintained with Washington, but a complementary mechanism that can operate alongside them. Egypt's failure to define Iran directly as a security threat could weaken assessments that the structure was established against Iran.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei said there was no reason to be concerned that the agreement between Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia was directed against Iran. Baghaei said regional countries should cooperate for their own security without depending on actors from outside the region.
Qatar's search for security
Qatar is also among the strong candidates for possible expansion. Doha, which has defense ties with Türkiye, normalized relations with Saudi Arabia following the 2021 Al-Ula Agreement.
Qatar faced Iranian missile attacks during the war that began on February 28, 2026, after an Israeli airstrike targeting a Hamas delegation in Doha on September 9, 2025. While its security relationship with the United States and the American military presence at Al Udeid continue, these developments have led to assessments that existing security guarantees have not been able to keep Qatar completely insulated from the effects of regional conflicts.
Under these circumstances, Doha could be expected to diversify its existing security ties through new partnerships rather than end them. Qatar's accession to the agreement could increase the structure's political weight and financial capacity.
Iraq's participation and regional inclusiveness
Iraq's membership could strengthen the impression that the Mecca alliance could evolve from an anti-Iran or sectarian bloc into a broader regional defense structure. Iraq's participation, despite Iran's strong political and security influence in the country, could weaken assessments that the agreement is a Sunni alliance.
Baghdad's membership could also bring to the table an actor able to voice Iran's concerns from within the structure. The Development Road Project, which has the potential to connect security cooperation with economic integration along the Türkiye-Iraq-Gulf corridor, is considered one of the factors that make Iraq's participation significant.
Nevertheless, Iraq is seen as one of the most difficult candidates for expansion. The political and military influence of armed groups close to Iran in Iraq could make it harder for Baghdad to assume a collective defense obligation. It also remains uncertain how Iran's positive approach to the agreement would change if it expanded into areas such as Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen, where Iranian influence is stronger.
An alternative to Washington's models
The agreement's expansion could present an alternative model for the political framework within which regional security is established in the Middle East. While Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Türkiye maintain strong security relations with the United States, one of the models Washington has promoted in recent years has been the expansion of the Abraham Accords, signed in 2020.
On May 25, 2026, Donald Trump called on six countries, including Türkiye, to join the Abraham Accords with Israel and said Iran could also become part of a similar process in the future. Pakistan rejected the call, while Saudi Arabia reiterated that it would not normalize relations with Israel without progress on the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Less than three months later, the presence of Türkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia in the same defense agreement led to assessments that a different option had emerged in regional security. Although the agreement's content and effectiveness will become clearer over time, it is argued that this model could have a legitimacy advantage among regional publics.
The expansion's test of joint decision-making
The future of the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement could be determined not only by the number of members but also by the nature of the countries that join. Egypt could provide military and political weight, Qatar depth and financial capacity in the Gulf region, and Iraq broader regional legitimacy. New members such as Jordan could also expand the alliance's geographical scope.
An increase in the number of members could strengthen the alliance's representational power and overall capacity. However, bringing different threat perceptions together under a common security understanding could become more difficult. The structure's fundamental test will be to turn the principle that an attack on one member is considered an attack on all members into joint planning, decision-making and implementation mechanisms.
If these mechanisms can be established, the agreement could create a new layer of security in which regional countries assume greater responsibility for their own security, rather than replacing existing security partnerships.
